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Chapter 5
Historical Approaches to Creativity and Innovation
Simon Ville

Introduction
Historians have been interested in innovation per se but especially for its contribution
to economic growth. This contribution has been widely interpreted through new
processes and products but also new ways of organising economic and business
activity. Historians have had less to say, however, about creativity than innovation.
Interest has largely focussed upon the end result of creativity, that is, innovation. This
is in large part because of the greater interest in the economic and social consequences
of innovation than its origins. In addition, creativity is not easily substantiated through
historical evidence since it is not so obviously outcome-based, or as easily
documented, as innovation. Nor has much been written about the reverse causality,
that is, of innovation upon subsequent creativity. However, increased interest in recent
years on the role of human capital in economic progress and the development of
knowledge sectors has motivated closer historical consideration of the creative origins
of innovation.

In this chapter, I will analyse historical approaches to creativity and innovation.
Initially, this will take the form of a broad international comparative perspective and
then, more specifically, I will address recent Australian historical experience. This
will include a focussed look at sources of new technology in the interwar period. In
the final section of the paper, I will address briefly the policy implications arising
from the historical survey.
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Creativity, Innovation and the Economic Development of
Nations
Historians have laid emphasis on technological innovation as both a shorthand to
describe different phases of economic development and as a causal factor in
transitions between different epochs. One of the key drivers of a nation’s nature and
pace of economic development is innovation, particularly through the development of
cost-reducing processes, the introduction of new products and services, and the
development of new ways or organising the activities of firms.

The British ‘industrial revolution’ from the late eighteenth century was closely
associated with the beginnings of a shift from a cottage system of outworkers using
hand tools in cotton manufacture to the deployment of machine tools located in
centralised factories (Hudson 2004). Thus, innovation was associated with both
questions of spatial location and production technology. In addition, innovation was
seen as the key to the explanation for this new industrial age: steam provided the
wherewithal to power new machinery and, in turn, the railway system and steam
shipping that created national and international markets for the products of the new
manufacturing era. The chain effect of the new technology of steam rolled through the
middle decades of the nineteenth century—steam’s use in railways and shipping
motivated new advances in iron, steel, and engineering and with it a major stimulus to
the European economies (Ville 1990).

The late nineteenth century has been labelled a second industrial revolution—major
advances in new, more scientifically-based industries, and in different countries, were
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driving a new expansionary phase: German chemicals, electricity, and automobiles
should particularly be noted (Pierenkemper and Tilly 2004). American firms carried
these advances through into the twentieth century, particularly by extending German
technology into organisational and marketing innovations. Automobiles were now
mass produced on assembly lines, sold through specialist dealers offering hire
purchase, all of this achieved under new governance structures associated with
multidivisional organisations (Chandler 1966).

Moving into the second half of the twentieth century, the types and location of
innovation shifted once more and with it economic and industrial hegemony. From the
1950s Japanese firms began to challenge those in Europe and North America
particularly through holistic innovation in manufacturing systems, known as lean
production, new approaches to labour management, and the development of
imaginative forms of inter-firm transacting especially just-in-time contracting (Fruin
1992).

The diffusion and transfer of technology
Besides playing a role in the economic development of individual nations, innovation
provides us with a closer understanding of the interaction between the economic rise
and decline of nations. "Technological leapfrogging” is the ability of emerging
economies to invest in the latest phase of innovations unencumbered by the sunk costs
and interdependent requirements of older technologies. This process is made the more
compelling where a command structure, normally that of government, provides the
leadership for a poor, undeveloped economy to invest in innovation catch up as was
the experience of late nineteenth-century Russia (Gerschenkron 1962). It also
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requires an effective method of technology transfer. Historians have had much to say
about the receptacles and obstacles to technology transfer. David Jeremy, for
example, identified the key role of skilled British migrant textile workers in the
successful introduction and adaption of the cotton industry in nineteenth-century
United States (Jeremy 1981).

Related to leapfrogging and technology transfer is the need to distinguish between
originators and users of new technology. Originating firms and nations are the first to
absorb its economic benefits and have the trading opportunity to sell the innovation to
others. However, recipient users, including late developing nations, avoid the costs of
developing the technology and may gain more in terms of spanning developmental
gaps from its widespread deployment. Thus, based on a “social savings” calculation,
some later developing European nations, such as Spain, appear to have gained more
from their railway system than its technological originator, Britain (Ville 1990, 167)

History confirms that the choice and duration of an innovation is often not optimal.
Part of the explanation for this lies with human cognitive limits. It is also a function of
the interconnections between technological systems as the leapfrogging hypothesis
indicates. History provides us with the opportunity to operationalise the concept of
path dependency, wherein an initially favourable innovation may continue to operate
beyond what is economically optimal. The example is often given of the QWERTY
keyboard, designed to minimise key clashes on typewriters but still widely adopted
for computer age keyboards (David 2000).
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So far, our description of the sweep of history is suggestive of the role of so-called
critical, heroic or “macro-inventions”, which deals with an essentially new
technology, or a cluster of, that constitutes a radical break with the past and has the
ability to usher in a phase of renewed economic progress (Mokyr 1990). Where they
also generated large positive externalities as a “general purpose technology” (Lipsey
et al. 1998), their impact was substantial and wide-ranging, affecting both the pace of
economic growth and the sources of leadership. Examples of this are thought to
include steam power in the mid nineteenth century, electricity from the end of that
century, automobiles in the first half of the twentieth century, and information
technology in the second half. Long run economic fluctuations, known as Kondratiev
cycles, have been associated with macro-inventions, rising with the diffusion of each
new breakthrough and tailing back thereafter. However, within each major historical
phase of macro-invention lies many individual micro-inventions, which incrementally
improve the original concept and often bring the technology to a “tipping point”
whereat major economic breakthroughs are reached. To achieve sustained economic
progress, Mokyr argues, an economy, or particular industry, must generate both macro
and micro inventions. Thus, steam shipping finally dominated the major oceanic
routes by the 1880s, after decades of incremental improvements to engine efficiency,
with major implications for the efficiency of international trade and the emergence of
the first phase of globalisation (O'Rourke & Williamson 1999).

The institutional sources of creativity
A modified view of innovation mutes the centrality of the macro-invention and its
spreading effects achieved through externalities. Instead, “innovation is perceived as a
broad process, pervasively embedded in many industries” (Bruland 2004, 146). Its
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embracing nature is not the reverberation from a macro-invention but rather “a
general social propensity to innovate” as Bruland (2004, 146) noted of eighteenthcentury Britain. This perspective provides us with a powerful link between creativity
and innovation as general processes. North’s (1993, 16) idea of “mental models”
describes society-wide belief systems that help individuals understand and interact
with their environment. Mental models evolve gradually over time, their constancy
enabling us to make some generalisations about populations over longish periods of
time. Thus, some nations may have been more “creative” than others at particular
periods of history. If the industrial revolution was the creative awakening for Britain,
then the Renaissance might have been the same for Italy, and the so-called “Golden
Age” of the seventeenth century for the Netherlands. While we tend to associate these
particular phases of Italian and Dutch history with the creative visual arts, they were
also times of significant practical innovations, note the construction of the Dutch
system of canals and the innovative output of the Italian dockyards.

The institutional sources of the creative spur behind the principal phases of innovation
highlighted above have not gone unrecorded. Creativity has variously been associated
with major cultural and intellectual movements, types of educational institutions, the
capabilities of firms themselves, and the facilitating role of government. The socalled Age of Reason and the “Enlightenment” of seventeenth-century and eighteenthcentury England, which were associated with a spirit of rational and critical enquiry
into real world phenomena, has been widely viewed as an essential prerequisite to the
subsequent “industrial revolution”. This was seen as fostering an environment of
individual observation, inventiveness, and the generation of “useful knowledge” as a
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public good (Mokyr 2002), epitomised by Watt’s realisation of the practical
implications of the expansiveness of steam in a boiling kettle.

An emphasis upon more formal scientific and technical training in educational
institutions provided a breeding ground for creativity and experimentation in German
industry in the late nineteenth century (Arora, Landau and Rosenberg 1999).
American firms of the early twentieth century such as General Electric and
Westinghouse developed in-house research laboratories capable of developing a series
of related technical advances in engineering and chemicals (Chandler 1990). Likewise
Japanese firms contained notable research capabilities, but also drew upon
government organisations and incentives to pursue innovation in fields such as steel
and computing (Anchordoguy 1988).

Behavioural patterns and social processes help to provide an understanding of how
ideas are shaped. Attitudes to individualism and uncertainty undoubtedly impact on
the desire to experiment. Individualism expressed as a willingness to think and act
differently from the mainstream will engender new ideas and approaches. A literature
exists that associates de-familisation, the breakdown of large extended kinship ties,
with the fostering of individualistic enterprise cultures, which includes a desire to
innovate (Macfarlane 1978; 1987). Inventiveness requires a degree of risk-taking
given the likelihood of failure; it additionally represents a desire to mitigate sources of
uncertainty through the introduction of needed innovations. White (1992) and Ville
(1998) have both argued for the importance of risk and uncertainty as an organising
principle in the history of Australia. A desire to mitigate environmental uncertainties
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helped to shape business decisions and structures, and related to this is the fact that
much creative thinking and innovative activity was designed to reduce uncertainty.

Social capital and trust-based networks
Sociologists, economists and, more recently, historians have begun to analyse the role
of trust-based networks in sharing ideas and the flow of information relevant to
innovation across organisational divides and geographic boundaries. At the core of
this approach is the concept of social capital, which analyses the degree of interaction
among individuals and between organisations who trust one another. Such
information networks help to determine the extent, nature and direction of the flow of
ideas although this is not always optimal since networks can have exclusive as well as
inclusive implications (Maskell 2000; Ogilvie 2003). Geographic contiguity among
related industries can foster trust and generate reciprocating cycles of creativity and
innovation as firms provide an innovation response to a perceived need which in turn
motivates new creative opportunities; such is the Silicon Valley story (Lécuyer 2006).

While social capital can help to bridge institutional and cultural divides, the concept
of “communities of practice” explains how practitioners in the same field or industry
can develop a mutually supportive social environment for the flourishing of new ideas
(Wenger 1998). The rise of scientific and engineering societies in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries brought together in a meeting place the demand for and supply of
knowledge in the form of inventors and researchers, on the one hand, and firms that
would adopt the emergent “useful knowledge” on the other. Many such societies
codified their knowledge in published proceedings; for example, from 1860 the
Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects in Britain (Missing reference – not
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required – is a general comment on this journal) published the latest developments in
the rapidly advancing field of shipbuilding technology. This interaction of inventor
and user created reciprocal loops between creativity and innovation, as the former
reacted to insights gleaned from the perspectives and needs of the latter.

The accumulation of large stocks of social capital in Britain by the eighteenth century
has been viewed as an important prerequisite for subsequent rapid economic growth
(Szereter 2000). British migrants are believed to have transported their social capital
tradition with them to the United States and other settler nations including Australia
(Greene 2001). Such a view is consistent with Laird’s recent thesis that successful
entrepreneurs in nineteenth-century United States owed much to their social capital
connections (Laird 2006). Godley’s study of Jewish immigrant entrepreneurship in
New York and London, 1880-1914 (Godley, 2001 – Missing reference from
Reference list – IS in references), illustrates the role of trust-based networks carried
across geographic boundaries to the process of creativity and innovation. Moreover,
from a comparative perspective, it confirms the significance of particular national and
cultural environments as Jewish migrants in the United States behaved more
entrepreneurially than their otherwise identical counterparts in the United Kingdom.
His work forms part of a longer and broader historiography focussing on the cultural
determinants of economic development, which includes Weiner’s (1981) classic study
of the development of an anti-business culture in Britain from the late nineteenth
century

Our examples of the economic impact of displaced groups are replicated through
history, and their significance for creativity and innovation are heightened when they
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bring with them complementary stocks of human capital. Indeed, migrants have often
been highly talented bringing with them knowledge and creativity across many areas
of the economy and the arts. In such cases, it is often governmental intolerance of
diversity and heterodoxy that has driven out creative sectors of society to the
detriment of the domestic economy. Mokyr (2005) has used this insight to trace
increased toleration of heterodox ideas by European governments in the three
centuries after 1450. Analysing 1185 scientists, he estimates a decline in mobility
levels, despite improved transport facilities, as European states, competing for
economic advancement, embraced their heterodox creative thinkers.

Governments can go beyond benign tolerance to a more active encouragement of
creativity, particularly through mitigating many of the potential sources of market
failure. Khan and Sokoloff (2004) have shown how the design of smart patent law in
nineteenth-century United States made it easier for less wealthy and well-connected
individuals to become inventors than was the case in Europe. Well-defined property
rights, the enforcement of patent law, and the ability to raise finance through the
collateral of a patent were all key features of the American patent system. The effect
therefore was to foster creative activity more broadly throughout society.

Therefore, understanding the role played by particular institutions, such as social
networks, government policy, and educational and research organisations, and the
form of accepted behaviour (norms) between them and among individuals provides
the institutional framework in which innovation has occurred. This ”innovation
systems” approach has been widely conceptualised and analysed in the contemporary
innovation literature but has received little attention from historians (Nelson and
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Winter 1993; Edquist and McKelvey 2000). History, nonetheless, provides the setting
for analysing the evolution of distinctive innovation systems, that is, a combination of
elements of continuity – key patterns – moderated by historical experience and
change. Such patterns or layers, by setting some distinctive ground rules, have helped
to give shape and coherence to a multi-layered national framework for innovation at
the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Innovation in Resource-Based Economies: the Australian
Experience
Domestic innovation and its creative spur has been focussed on resource-based
industries throughout Australian history because of their key role in the economy,
both as a share of output, but particularly their dominance of exports. The share of
resources production (agricultural, pastoral and mining) in GDP fluctuated around 2535 per cent from the mid nineteenth century until the 1920s, thereafter declining
gradually to around 15 per cent by the 1980s (Healliwell 1984, 88). The share of
resources in exports fluctuated around 40 to 70 per cent (Pinkstone 1992). Staple
theory, which emphasises the stimuli accorded economic modernisation through
staple commodity exports, has been widely analysed and discussed in Australian
historiography (Pomfret 1981; Fogarty 1985). The advisability of development
centred on resource industries has been debated for at least half a century. It has been
argued that resource-based development is destined to fail since the “windfall”
associated with resource abundance has brought in its wake cognitive, societal, policy,
and economic constraints on development. In the 1990s Sachs and Warner (1995)
formalised this perspective into the “resource curse” hypothesis. Recent work has
provided something of a counterbalance by indicating that the curse is not inevitable
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and by investigating what resource-based economies can do to mitigate it (Ross 1999;
de Ferranti et al. 2002).

Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden testify to the
possibilities for successful resource-based development. One element of the debate is
whether resource-based development represents a focus on industries with a low
technological capability. As a consequence, this may have contributed to a loss of
relative international ranking of GDP per capita over the twentieth century as
Australia and similar nations missed out on high growth industries stimulated by rapid
technical progress such as automobiles, aviation, complex chemicals, and information
technology. Such a view is also consistent with a broader academic and popular
debate as to whether manufacturing industries should be the principal foundations of
any modern economy. As such, the following research questions might be addressed.
Are we correct to view primary industries as a low innovation sector? Does resourcebased development restrain a nation from participating in the rapid change and
sequential phases of new technology of the manufacturing and services sectors? Has
this form of development created a heavy reliance upon imported technology at the
expense of a domestic innovation system? We will address each of these questions in
turn.

Innovation in the primary industries
Resource-based industries are highly dependent upon the nature and vicissitudes of
climate, geology, and geography, each of which are highly spatially contingent, often
requiring a different response across nations or even sub-national regions.
Technology provides a means of moderating, these influences.
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The natural environment that primary industries have faced in Australia has few
parallels in other regions of the world, necessitating domestic solutions to many
production problems. Drought, poor soil quality and pestilence emphasised the
vulnerability of farming to output vicissitudes that have been marked even for such a
highly unpredictable sector. Early innovations in the farming sector, therefore,
focused on overcoming development obstacles and mitigating cyclical instability.
These included the jump stump plough, drought and disease tolerant wheats,
fertilisers, merino sheep breeding, dams, artesian wells, wire fencing and nets (Raby
1996). Moreover, regional differences in the environment have been marked, farming
processes and products varying, for example, between temperate coastal areas, inland
arid locations, and sub-tropical regions. In mining, Australia by the late nineteenth
century began to play a key international role as one of the major extractors of mineral
deposits and one of the principal sources of technical change. In contrast to the
proliferation of small scale operations in Australian farming, mining soon became
concentrated in the hands of the leading corporate players who had the resources and
motivation to drive innovation. BHP, in particular, has used its technological knowhow as a competitive advantage in becoming a resource-seeking multinational, for
example in the operation of coal mines in New Mexico, a large copper mine in Chile,
and a diamond mine in Canada.

Participation in new manufacturing innovation
While Australia has not been a key figure in most of the new high-tech industries of
the twentieth century, she has shared in many of the benefits they have brought to
producers and consumers. Australians, for example, have been heavy users of air
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transport and information technology products for both work and leisure. This has
particularly included the primary industries—aviation, for example, has facilitated
crop spraying, ore prospecting, and more generally facilitated communication with
remote mining and pastoral settlements. More recently, information technology has
improved operational efficiency such as through optimal crop watering and the
development of electronic auction sales. Australians, in general, have been amongst
the largest users, per capita, of information technology products. As such, they have
shared in its benefits which, particularly over the last decade, have favoured users
more than producers due to enormous improvements in efficiency and substantial
reductions in price. In particular, information technology has facilitated major
productivity improvements in the wholesale and retail trades, construction, and
finance (Gordon 2000).

Australia has participated in high tech industries where tradeability has been limited
by the physical cost of importing or the specific needs of the local market, or where
government policy has provided subsidies, tariffs or other forms of support to foster a
local industry. A classic example has been the automobile industry where a series of
tariff and exchange incentives facilitated the first entirely Australian-built vehicle in
1948 (Conlon & Perkins 2001, 115-16).

Vertical integration and product diversification by major Australian resource
companies have provided opportunities to embrace manufacturing innovation.
Capabilities initially established in resource industries were often extended forward
into processing and, ultimately, final good production. CSR and BHP are both notable
examples of this. CSR’s early success in the nineteenth century rested on being the

15
first company to install technologically-advanced sugar refining plants on a scale that
dramatically lowered costs. By the 1930s, its research laboratories, supported by
foreign licences, visits to overseas plants, and international joint ventures, led the firm
to new downstream products, particularly in the alcohol and chemicals industries.
After World War Two, related diversification into building materials became the
company’s focus including the production of vinyl flooring (1949), insulation and
hardboard (1959), particle board (1960), and pre-mixed concrete (1965) (Hutchinson
2001, 109-10). Technical efficiency became the company’s watchword. BHP
vertically integrated forwards from mining to become the steel industry leader with
major plants in Newcastle (1915) and Port Kembla (1935). Subsequently, it
diversified into a range of related downstream products, which included steel alloys,
hot water systems, and tools. Significantly, both companies have now leveraged their
technical leadership overseas, CSR in the American building materials industry
through Rinker, and BHP-Billiton, now separated from its steel-making capability
(Bluescope), in many overseas resource industries as noted earlier.

Imported technology or a domestic innovation system?
International technology transfer has been a key part of the innovation process in
Australia, particularly outside the resource-based industries. This has occurred
through a variety of channels. Many modern manufacturing industries in Australia are
dominated by foreign multinationals, who have imported innovations as part of their
process of establishment and operation. On other occasions, technology has been
transferred as part of a joint venture between a local and a foreign firm. It has been
estimated that 83 per cent of the firms responsible for major innovations between
1939 and 1953 had overseas affiliations, while 80 per cent of payments by Australian
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firms for technical know-how in 1988-9 went to related foreign enterprises (Hocking
1958, 28-9; Bureau of Industry Economics 1993, 122).

It might be inferred from such a heavy reliance upon foreign technology that Australia
has lacked a domestic or national innovation system, with most local inventiveness
being restricted to some specific, largely primary, industries. Freeman defines a
national innovation system as: “the network of institutions in the public and private
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new
technologies” (Freeman 1987, 10). Thus, innovativeness includes activities
associated with imported technologies. Perhaps most significant is the modification
and adaption of foreign technologies to suit local needs, a process requiring
significant creative and inventive energy. A sample of firms in the 1970s revealed that
42 per cent of their research budget was spent on modifying foreign technology (Parry
& Watson 1979, 107-9).

Gregory identified four distinctive features of the Australian innovation system, each
of which has an ongoing historical resonance: low science and technology
expenditure, low private R & D, high government financing and participation in
research, and high dependence on foreign technology. Consistent with its role in many
aspects of the Australian economy, government has served as a major provider of
finance and of research organisations. Much of this support has been oriented to the
rural sector in recognition of the market failure problems associated with a
proliferation of small producers for much of our history. Moreover, it represents a
response to unique environmental challenges and the realisation that most of the
benefits will be captured locally in commodity markets dominated by Australia

17
(Gregory 1993, 325-9). The CSIRO and its predecessor CSIR is a major public sector
research organisation oriented to the needs of resource industries (Schedvin 1987).
Other aspects of a national innovation system that might be emphasised a little more
include the role of educational institutions, both vocationally oriented such as Schools
of Mines [why was this highlighted?] and agricultural colleges, and more broadly
based universities as providers of pure and applied research. Agricultural and pastoral
societies are a reminder of the role of social and community movements in
innovation. Stock and station agents have provided a key network node connecting
farmers with a wider business and research community (Ville, 2000, 153-61). Finally,
the contribution of domestic corporations has perhaps been understated in place of
global companies. Local firms have played a role in negotiating joint ventures with
overseas firms, seeking out other sources of knowledge, and honing their adaptive
capabilities.

Research Focus: The Technological Drivers of Structural
Change in Interwar Australiai
“…in 1914 (Australia) could barely arm its expeditionary forces with rifles, is today
able to manufacture locally a sufficient quantity of the most modern and complicated
weapons from warships to guns” (Australian Investment Digest, April 15, 1940, p.
148).

It has long been assumed that tariff policy drove structural change in the interwar
Australian economy from rural industries towards manufacturing by providing price
protection for infant or inefficient industries (Benham 1928; Anderson & Garnaut
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1987). Investment shifts in favour of manufacturing, however, may have owed more
to exogenous changes in process and product technology than to the impact of public
policy. Thomas (1988, 271) has argued that “Australia’s continued march towards
industrialisation was based not on artificial inducements to produce manufactures, but
on lower costs, underwritten by increased efficiency and productivity”.
Manufacturing not only expanded in sise, its technological base and what it produced
changed dramatically. Technology, largely imported from abroad, was the catalyst for
change by creating new products and reconfiguring cost functions. Its adaptation,
industry by industry across the 1920s and 1930s, has been mapped by Mauldon
(1938) who shows that there were marked differences in the rate of what he describes
as mechanisation between industries and across time.

The key to this pattern of technological change was the emergence of two new general
purpose technologies, electricity and the automobile. Their impact was substantial and
wide-ranging. Demand for both products increased rapidly from low starting points
during the interwar period. These technologies transformed many aspects of both
consumption and production. Electricity provided the technological base for a wide
range of new and improved consumer durables. Automobiles constituted a major new
durable in themselves, which, like the many electrical household products, heralded
major and exciting changes in personal lifestyles. On the production side, the
flexibility, controllability, divisibility, and speed of electrical power provided many
productivity-enhancing opportunities, particularly through the spread of electric
motors. Automobile production created the demand directly for many new related
industries such as petrol refining, the manufacture and repair of a wide range of
vehicle parts, and the construction of roads and parking stations. Motor vehicles

19
increased factor mobility across many industries, especially through improved access
to raw materials and better commuting opportunities for workers in labour-intensive
manufacturing.

In both cases, therefore, these new technologies created a clustering of new industries
around them, but also provided productivity improvements in many older and
unrelated sectors. Finally, note should also be made of the impact of these
technological breakthroughs on the service sector including public transport (trains,
trams, buses, and taxis), distribution systems (road vehicle transport), retail (store
organisation and presentation), finance (vehicle hire purchase), and leisure (moving
pictures), holiday accommodation, and recorded music), which in turn fed back into
further demand for manufacturing products.

A recently-constructed database of most new capital issues in this period reveals the
acquisition and adaptation of foreign patents by innovative-minded domestic firms to
be a central part of this process of industrial transformation. The capital issues
information, extracted from the Australian Investment Digest, contains evidence of
2176 new issues across the interwar period and, when compared with stock exchange
data for increased company capitalisation, it appears to have captured most new
issues. The aggregate trend for the number of new capital issues and the amount
raised over the interwar period describes a pronounced cycle similar to other
measurements of economic fluctuations in Australia. There was a steady rise of
capital issues until the onset of the Depression around 1929 when their numbers fell
sharply, followed by a recovery from the mid 1930s. The distribution of new issues,
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either by number or value, across the major economic sectors confirms the
conventional wisdom, that resources were being shifted into manufacturing.

The question of investment motivation is aided by information on the reason for the
capital issue, which has been coded into some standard explanations. Interestingly,
more than half (58 per cent) of the value of new issues in manufacturing was derived
from new companies. Twenty-five per cent of new issues were by new companies
seeking to purchase the rights to manufacture and/or sell another company’s products.
This was predominantly about acquiring a patent from the inventor or seeking to
replicate domestically the success of a product in a foreign market. This was the
largest individual motivator and, in the case of new companies, accounted for almost
half of the investment decisions. The subdivisions where this purpose was most
significant were transport equipment manufacturing, accounting for 52 per cent of its
issues, followed by petroleum and coal product manufacturing and polymer product
and rubber product manufacturing (each 50 per cent), then machinery and equipment
manufacturing (45 per cent). These were the new technology industries of the period
most closely associated with electricity and the automobile. Sixty per cent of issues
with this purpose (seeking to purchase the rights to manufacture and/or sell another
company’s goods or services) were directly related to the technologies of electricity or
vehicle production.

The figure of 25 per cent understates the significance of innovation since a further 12
per cent of new issues were merely declared as start up capital for a new company,
and a further 18 per cent as expansion or improvement capital for an existing
company. A further 20 per cent of all new issues by existing companies did not state a
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reason, secretiveness doubtless playing a role for some innovating enterprises. Despite
the lack of detailed explanation for most existing companies, we expect many
purchased new technology through licences and patents and paid for other companies’
brands. Thus, an extreme interpretation is that as much as 75 per cent of new capital
issues in manufacturing were motivated by a desire to innovate. If innovation is
interpreted in the broader sense to include organisational restructuring, the proportion
rises above 80 per cent.

The expansion of existing companies was common in more mature industries such as
food products, beverage and tobacco products; textiles, leather, clothing and footwear;
and primary metal and metal products. Even in these mature industries, however,
there were a notable number of new firms. In food products, possessing one of the
largest shares of capital issues, more than a quarter of issues were made by new
companies seeking to purchase rights to another company’s goods or services (16 per
cent ) or seeking start-up capital (13 per cent ).

While this research throws light on the role of innovation in structural change, we
have yet to discover the origins of the creative spur behind this outpouring of
innovation and adaptation. The opportunities provided by the new general purpose
technologies undoubtedly motivated a response in Australia as in many other nations.
However, the wide range of innovation across industries and firms old and new is
suggestive of a broader propensity to innovate, which goes beyond mere imitation of
overseas innovation. Australia went through a structural shift from primary to
secondary industries that contrasted with the old to new manufacturing industry shift
in many other smaller advanced nations in Europe that were importing American and
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British technology. If Australia’s experience was quite different and more marked
than most nations, historical landmarks may play a role particularly the significance of
Federation, World War One, and the broadening of trade routes and migration
patterns in creating an Australia that was more independent and confident of its
position in the world and was developing a much wider range of international ties and
associations. Put another way, it may well prove to be the case that rapid institutional
changes in early twentieth-century Australia lay behind a notably innovative phase of
economic development. Comparisons with New Zealand, a resource-based economy
that experienced more muted institutional change but also less sectoral diversification,
may be instructive.

Implications for Policy
What policy implications, if any, may be drawn from our historical survey of
creativity and innovation?

Innovation has come in many forms (product, process, organisational) and is clearly a
major driver of phases of transformational economic change and changing industrial
leadership among nations. The questions that arise from this statement are pertinent
for future policy. In particular, how do nations make the most of the flow-on benefits
from phases of innovation—making the right choices among technological
alternatives, maximising the positive externalities, and optimising its duration.

A range of considerations may influence the choice of technologies at any one time,
should the focus be on a nation’s areas of comparative advantage or embrace the
opportunities for diversification presented by innovation. Australia’s approach has

23
manifested various options—strong continued emphasis upon comparative advantages
in resource_based industries, but diversification into manufacturing in the interwar
period by adaptation of foreign technologies.

History confirms that general purpose technologies have a powerful transformational
role although the principal beneficiaries are not always obvious—continental
European gains from the railways and Australian gains from electricity and the
automobile. In most of the high growth innovative industries of the twentieth century
Australia has been an adapter and user of technologies developed overseas. As we
have seen with ICT over the last fifteen years, there are many benefits from being a
user nation. What is critical, however, is the ability to envisage the potential role and
application of foreign_derived technologies, the facilitation of its transfer and
adaptation, and the establishment of incentives for its domestic pervasion.

Finally, optimal duration is about acknowledging that macro innovations are followed
by many years of incremental micro inventions that transform the efficiency and
impact of the original innovation. The ability to gain leadership at the incremental
stages can have wide-ranging implications, note for example the success of Japanese
computer companies following initial leadership by American firms. However,
duration is also about regime change—why do problems of path dependency emerge
and how does regime change occur among nations and industries? While there has
been an historical focus on explaining the rise of British, American and Japanese
manufacturing, equally valuable would be to understand more about the leaders’ fall
from grace.
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Australia presents particular innovation challenges—as a small nation with a
comparative advantage in resource-based industries. We suggested earlier that
institutional structure is more important than industrial location for a nation. Nor is
smallness necessarily a barrier to innovative activity. If innovation leadership remains
a possibility, there are two approaches worth pursuing in light of recent historical
trends. In the second half of the twentieth century, Australia’s population and
domestic market grew rapidly. Yet, in many cases, scale economies accelerated more
rapidly, meaning the opportunity to compete in many major industries diminished
(Forster 1970). However, the raft of changes associated with globalisation and
deregulation has enabled smaller economies to compete with increasing effectiveness
at the sub-industry level as international specialisation within global industries
expands. There is growing evidence to suggest that while manufacturing’s share of
Australian GDP has been contracting recently, that output is increasingly efficient,
competitive and innovative (Anderson 2001, Table 13.4).

A much more recent development is the growing global concern for more efficient
management of our natural resources for fear of the consequences of depletion and
pollution. This throws the emphasis back upon innovation in resource-based industries
and the opportunity for nations like Australia to leverage their expertise here. Recent
developments in geosequestration technology is an example of this. History teaches
us that resource-based economies can be highly successful and innovative and that it
is the broader question of institutional framework that determines performance not the
sectoral emphasis of production. As Blainey (2006, 11) noted in a recent survey of
the history of Australian innovation, “The history of agriculture in the last 150 years is
the history of innovation.”
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If many nations have experienced periods of creative awakening, what can
governments do to foster a creative society and economy and to translate a sense of
creativity into Mokyr’s “useful knowledge” (Mokyr, 2002). Valuing creativity and
heterodox thinking is a message that emanates clearly from the historical literature.
Investment in human capital may be one response but the solution is also about the
learning system itself and how we learn. Tolerating unorthodoxy, pure undirected
research, and accepting that many areas of creative thinking and research will not
produce any tangible outcome are part of the story. So too is fostering a strong sense
of trust, cooperation and sharing as reflected in the concept of social capital. The
treatment of science as a public good and the interaction of scientific researchers and
practitioners in eighteenth_century Britain provides lessons for the twenty-firstcentury policy makers grappling with the significance of open source technologies
and community-style websites as receptacles for shared learning.
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